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Abstract. We present an original theorem in auction theory: it specifies
general conditions under which the sum of the payments of all bidders
is necessarily not identically zero, and more generally not constant.
Moreover, it explicitly supplies a construction for a finite minimal set
of possible bids on which such a sum is not constant. In particular, this
theorem applies to the important case of a second-price Vickrey auction,
where it reduces to a basic result of which a novel proof is given. To
enhance the confidence in this new theorem, it has been formalized in
Isabelle/HOL: the main results and definitions of the formal proof are re-
produced here in common mathematical language, and are accompanied
by an informal discussion about the underlying ideas.
1 Introduction
The ForMaRE project [4] employs formal methods to provide a unified approach
to both the generation of executable code for running auctions and the proving
of theorems about them. In this paper, we will describe the formalization of a
classical result about the second price Vickrey auction (which will be introduced
in Section 2), stating that the sum of the payments for all participants cannot
be zero for all possible bids. We will indicate this result as NB (for no balance).
The proof mechanism we present for NB is, to the best of our knowledge,
new. Although it is also applicable to the specific case of the Vickrey auction,
our proof works for a wide class of possible auction mechanisms: indeed, it gives
a characterization of the kinds of auctions for which it holds. By contrast, all the
existing proofs we know of vitally rely on the particular algebraic form that the
mechanism assumes in the particular case of the Vickrey auction. Furthermore,
our proof explicitly constructs a minimal, finite set of possible bids on which the
sum of all the payments is not a constant function.
All the results have been formalized and checked in the Isabelle/HOL the-
orem prover [7]. Because the results are new, they are stated here in common
mathematical language, which should be friendlier for the reader. The lem-
mas, definitions, and theorems in this paper correspond as far as possible their
∗This work has been supported by EPSRC grant EP/J007498/1 and an LMS Com-
puter Science Small Grant.
formalized counterparts and for each statement we indicate the corresponding Is-
abelle name in typewriter font. The relevant Isabelle theory file is Maskin3.thy,
available at https://github.com/formare/auctions/.
1.1 Structure of the paper
In Section 2, some context is given: we will see the basic mathematical definitions
for auctions, which will be needed to state the main theorem NB, the object of
the present formalization.
Section 3 informally illustrates the idea behind our original proof of NB, and
Section 4 presents the formal result implementing this idea, which is Lemma 1.
This lemma is the cornerstone of the whole formalization effort presented here:
all the other results depend on it.
This fact is illustrated in Section 5, where it is informally explained how
Lemma 1 can be applied to the particular case of the Vickrey auction.
This informal explanation is then made formal and systematic in Section
6, where ancillary lemmas and definitions are given in order to formally derive
from Lemma 1 the main result, Theorem 1, which is the formal statement of
our generalized version of NB.
1.2 Notations
– We will represent any function (e.g., the one associating to each participant
her bid) in a set-theoretical fashion; that is, as the set {(x, f (x)) |x ∈ dom f},
commonly called the graph of f . Hence, for example, the cartesian product
X × {y} is the constant function defined on X and yielding y.
– Similarly, any relation will be represented as the set of the pairs of elements
related through it; formally, this means that any relation is a subset of some
cartesian product X × Y .
– Given a relation R, R (X) will be the image of the setX through R: R (X) :=
{y| (x, y) ∈ R and x ∈ X}. For example, given a function f , f−1 ({y}) will
then be the fiber of the point y under f .
– The restriction of a function f to the set-theoretical difference dom f\X will
be written f − X ; moreover, in the special case of X = {x}, we will often
abuse the notation, writing f − x instead of f − {x}.
– A multiset (also called a bag) will be extensionally denoted writing, e.g.,
{|0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2|}: we recall that a multiset is similar to a set, but each member
has a multiplicity describing how many times it appears in the multiset. We
will use + as the infix symbol for pairwise multiset union; we will write
A ≤ B to express the fact that A is a sub-multiset of B: for instance,
{|2, 1, 1|} ≤ {|0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2|} is true.
– Finally, x ⇀ X denotes the operation of union of x with each set in the
family of sets X :
x ⇀ X := {x ∪ x′ : x′ ∈ X} .
We will need this operation to state Lemma 1.
2 Statement of the main result
An auction mechanism is mathematically represented through a pair of functions
a, p: the first describes how the goods at stake are allocated among the bidders
(also called participants or agents), while the second specifies how much each
bidder pays following this allocation. Each possible output of this pair of func-
tions is referred to as an outcome of the auction. Both functions take the same
argument, which is another function, commonly called a bid vector ; it describes
how much each bidder prefers each possible outcome of the auction. This prefer-
ence relation is usually expressed through money, hence the bid vector associates
some outcome to how much the participant values that outcome. To stick with
traditional notation, we will use bold face for bid vectors, as in a (b).
In the case of a single good being auctioned, the bid vector simply associates
to each bidder the amount she bids for the good. Given a fixed bidder i, moreover,
ai is {0, 1}-valued, corresponding to the fact that i either wins the item or not.
For a single good auction, the Vickrey mechanism has a special relevance because
of the formal properties it enjoys [5, 3]. It works by assigning the good to the
highest bidder. Each agent then pays a ‘fee’ term p′i (b− i) irrespective of the
outcome; this fee does not depend on how much i herself bids, but only on the
other participants’ bids: hence the argument of p′i is b − i rather than the full
b. Additionally, the winner pays a proper price term given by the highest of the
bids computed on the set of participants excluding the winner herself (second
price); given a fixed bid vector b, we will denote this amount as f2 (b).
An often desirable property of an auction mechanism is that it achieves budget
balancing [6, Section 2.3]. This means that the sum of the money given or received
by each participant always totals to zero:
∀b
∑
i
pi (b) = 0. (1)
Such a property becomes attractive when
it is preferable to maintain as much wealth as possible within the group
of agents, and the transfer payment can be viewed as an undesirable
“cost of implementation”. [1]
There are important cases in which (1) assumes a more specific form:‡
∀b f (b) +
∑
i
p′i (b− i) = 0, (2)
where f typically extracts some kind of maximum: e.g., for the single-good Vick-
rey mechanism, f (b) is the second price f2 (b). The function p
′
i is related to pi
through a simple construction we are not interested in here. Here, the important
fact is the formal difference between pi and p
′
i: the former takes as an argument
‡We recall that bid vectors are modeled as functions, hence we can write b−i, using
the notation introduced in Section 1.2.
the full bid vector, while the latter takes a reduced bid vector, in which the bid
pertaining participant i has been removed.
A standard result [6, Theorem 2.2], [5, Proposition 3], [2, Theorem 4.1] is
that for such cases, budget balancing cannot be satisfied: (1) is false. Its known
proofs, however, all exploit the particular form of the map f appearing in (2) in
the considered case, namely that of f being f2. Vice versa, we will see a proof
starting from (2) where the latter map is considered as an unknown; the proof
will work out the conditions it needs to impose on that map: only after that
we will ascertain they are fulfilled for the given cases we are interested in (e.g.,
the mentioned single-good Vickrey auction). To be even more informative, the
proof will show that to falsify equation (2), it is not needed to quantify it over
all the possible b admissible as an argument to f : a smaller, finite set X will be
suggested by the proof itself.
Hence, we will consider the logical formula
∀b ∈ X
∑
i
p′i (b− i) = f (b) (3)
and study for what X and f it leads to a contradiction (which will include, of
course, our starting case (2), where f = −f). Since we are going to set up a
proof mechanism minimizing the requirements on the generic f (e.g., we are not
going to expect that f is the maximum or the second maximum of the bids),
we must impose some different premises to carry through a proof. The main
assumption needed is one of symmetry: while the pis in (1) (and hence the p
′
is
in (2)) are completely arbitrary, we need to require that they do not depend on
re-labeling the participants:
∃P ∀i b p′i (b) = P (‖b‖), (4)
where ‖R‖ is the multiset (or bag) obtained from the relation R: that is, the
range of R, but taking into account the multiplicities of possibly repeated values
in it.§ This means that the price paid by any participant i is given by a rule
depending only on the amount of each bid other than i’s, and not on who placed
those. Moreover, such a rule itself must not depend on i.
With this assumption in place, (3) becomes
∀b ∈ X
∑
i
P (‖b− i‖) = f (b) . (5)
§For example, given the map associating to participant 1 the bid 10, to participant
2 the bid 20, and to participant 3 the bid 10, the obtained multiset is {|10, 10, 20|}.
3 Proof idea
Let N be the number of bidders. The proof starts by considering the case that
they all submit the same (fixed but arbitrary) bid b0, whence (5) yields:
P




∣∣∣∣∣∣b0, . . . , b0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣



 = k0f

b0, . . . , b0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N

 , (6)
with k0 :=
1
N
not depending on b0. Then we continue with a b in which only
one component (let us say the first, for example) assumes an arbitrary value b1
different than b0; thus, (5) gives
(N − 1)P




∣∣∣∣∣∣b1, b0, . . . , b0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−2
∣∣∣∣∣∣



 = −P




∣∣∣∣∣∣b0, . . . , b0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣



 − f (b1, b0, . . . , b0) .
(7)
At this point, we would like to trigger an iterative mechanism by exploiting
(6) inside (7). A natural imposition to make this possible is to ask that
f (b1, b0, . . . , b0) = q1f (b0, . . . , b0) (8)
for some arbitrary constant q1. Then we can substitute (6) inside (7), obtaining
a rational number k1 not depending on b0, b1 such that
P




∣∣∣∣∣∣b1, b0, . . . , b0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−2
∣∣∣∣∣∣



 = k1f (b0, . . . , b0) . (9)
Proceding the same way, we can build a rational constant k2 such that
P




∣∣∣∣∣∣b1, b2, b0, . . . , b0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−3
∣∣∣∣∣∣



 = k2f (b0, . . . , b0) (10)
for arbitrary b1, b2.
So that by iterating this mechanism we can construct a relation binding the
generic P ({|b1, . . . , bN−2, b0|}) to f (b0, . . . , b0):
P ({|b1, . . . , bN−2, b0|}) = kN−2f (b0, . . . , b0) . (11)
Moreover, at each step of this iteration, the requirement (8) gives indications
about how q1, q2, . . ., X and f must be related if we want the proof mechanism
to work. It is important to note that, in doing so, such mutual relations should
be weakened as much as possible, with the only rationale that they should grant
that the proof mechanism just outlined actually works. For example, we imposed
one equality of the kind (8) at each inductive step, but these equalities actually
need to hold only for the bid vectors inside some minimal X ; otherwise, we would
restrict ourselves to quite trivial instances of f . In this section, we wanted to
give a general idea of the proof, and we did not explicitly state the exact mutual
relations between b0, X and f . Indeed, such relations are not immediate, at first:
they actually became clearer when formalizing the proof itself; a process that
we feel would have been harder to manage with a standard paper-based proof.
These relations will be given in full detail in Section 4, in Definition 1.
The iteration explained above implies that we assign some value to the num-
bers q1, q2, . . .. We deemed them arbitrary because the proof mechanism works
whichever values we assign them. For simplicity, however, we restricted our work
to the case
1 = q1 = q2 = . . . , (12)
which will be general enough for any application to auction theory.
The idea is now to take equation (11), which was obtained using equation (5),
and to derive a contradiction between it and (5) itself. Hence, the formalization
can be seen as split in two stages: there is Lemma 1, presented in Section 4, which
formalizes equation (11) and takes care of spelling out all the exact requirements
in order to derive it exploiting the idea we informally presented above. Then there
are other auxiliary definitions and lemmas, presented in Section 6, which employ
Lemma 1 to obtain the wanted contradiction (given in the thesis of Theorem 1).
4 From the idea to the formal statement
Given a multiset m, an m-restriction of b is any b′ ⊆ b such that ‖b′‖ = m.
An m-completion of b to b0 is a b
′ writable as the disjoint union of an
m-restriction of b with a function constantly valued b0, and such that dom b =
dom b′. In other words, anm-completion of b to b0 is obtained from b by changing
its value to b0 outside some m-restriction of it.
A full family of b0-completions of b is a set containing one m-completion of
b to b0 for each possible m ≤ ‖b‖.
Lemma 1 (lll57). Consider a full family Y of b0-completions of b, and set
X := ({i1, i2} × {b0}) ⇀ Y for some i1 6= i2 outside dom b. Assume that,
∀b′ ∈ X:
f (b′) = f (({i1, i2} ∪ domb)× {b0}) (13)
f (b′) =
∑
i∈dom b′
P (b′ − i) . (14)
Then
P (‖b‖+ {|b0|}) =
1
2 + |dom b|
f (({i1, i2} ∪ dom b)× {b0}) .
For later discussion, it will be useful to express requirements in Lemma 1 up
to equality (13) in a predicate form:
Definition 1. [pred2, pred3] The set X is adequate for the quintuple
(b, b0, f, i1, i2) if
– X = {i1, i2}⇀ Y for some Y being a full family of b0-completions of b;
– ∀b′ ∈ X f (b′) = f (({i1, i2} ∪ dom b)× {b0}) .
This allows us to restate Lemma 1 as
Lemma 2 (lll57). Assume that X is adequate for the quintuple (b, b0, f, i1, i2),
and that
∀b′ ∈ X
∑
i∈dom b′
P (b′ − i) = f (b′) .
Then
P (‖b‖+ {|b0|}) =
1
2 + |dom b|
f (({i1, i2} ∪ dom b)× {b0}) .
5 Example application to the Vickrey auction
Let us consider the specific case of f = −f2: we recall that f2 (b) is the maximum
of the bids b, once the bid of the winner has been removed. In this case, choosing
any b0 ≥ max(rng b) satisfies hypothesis (13) of Lemma 1, permitting
P (‖b‖+ {|b0|}) =
−b0
2 + |domb|
. (15)
Let us apply this to two particular bid vectors:
b := (1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 1, n+ 3) b := (1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 2, n+ 3) .
We get
f2 (b) +
∑
i
P (‖b− i‖)
(15)
= (n+ 1)−
[
(n+ 3)
n+ 2
(n+ 1)
]
−
n+ 1
n+ 2
6= n+ 2−
[
(n+ 3)
n+ 2
(n+ 1)
]
−
n+ 2
n+ 2
(15)
= f2
(
b
)
+
∑
i
P
(∥∥b− i∥∥) . (16)
Thus, we have falsified (2) as an application of Lemma 1. To do that, we had to
apply Lemma 1 n+2 times for the first equality of the chain above, and further
n+ 2 times for its last equality. This corresponds to having imposed (5) on the
sets {
{i, j} × {n+ 3}⇀ Cn+3
b−i−j
}
b(j)=n+3
i∈dom b−{j}
(17)
(
b
−1 {n+ 1, n+ 3}
)
× {n+ 1}⇀ Cn+1
b−b−1{n+1,n+3}
(18)
and on the sets {
{i, j} × {n+ 3}⇀ Cn+3
b−i−j
}
b(j)=n+3
i∈dom b−{j}
(19)
(
b
−1
{n+ 2, n+ 3}
)
× {n+ 2}⇀ Cn+2
b−b
−1
{n+2,n+3}
(20)
respectively. Above, we have indicated with Cb
b
a fixed, arbitrary full family of
b-completions of b. Hence, the union of the family of sets in (17), the union of
that in (19), the sets in (18), (20), together with
{
b, b
}
, form the wanted set X :
we have a contradiction when imposing (5) on it.
6 Application to the general case
Formally, as a first step of what we did in Section 5, we apply Lemma 1 to
each possible b− i appearing in (5), obtaining an equality for the sum featured
there. The following result does exactly that and is an immediate corollary of
Lemma 2:
Corollary 1 (lll68). Assume that ∀i ∈ dom b there are ji and Xi such that
ji ∈ dom b\ {i}
Xi is adequate for (b− {i, ji} , b (ji) , f, i, ji) .
Also assume that
∀b′ ∈
⋃
Xi
∑
i∈dom b′
P (‖b′ − i‖) = f (b′) .
Then
∑
i∈dom b
P ({|b− i|}) =
1
|dom b|
∑
i∈dom b
f (dom b× {b (ji)}) . (21)
What we informally did in Section 5 was to find b, b to each of which corol-
lary 1 is applicable, but such that the maps η : i 7→ f
(
domb×
{
b
(
j
i
)})
and
η : i 7→ f
(
domb×
{
b
(
ji
)})
enjoy the following properties:
1. each assumes exactly two values, call them v1 6= v2 and v1 6= v2, respectively;
2. of these four values, exactly two are equal, let us say v1 = v1, while v2 6= v2;
3. the sets η−1
{
v1
}
and η−1
{
v1
}
coincide: that is, the points on which η and
η yield the same value are exactly the same.
These facts cause the occurrence of the two identical terms which can be can-
celled in expression (16): they are put in square brackets there for clarity. This
cancellation is fundamental, because it immediately allows to establish the in-
equality appearing there. Finding such b and b is particularly easy in the case
of f = f2, but the same mechanism works for a generic f , leading to a similar
cancellation between the two sums∑
i∈dom b
f
(
dom b×
{
b
(
j
i
)})
and ∑
i∈dom b
f
(
dom b×
{
b
(
ji
)})
;
each of those sums is yielded by a separate application of corollary 1, in the right
hand side of equation (21).
To formalize the requirements (1), (2), (3) appearing in the list above, we
introduce the following definition:
Definition 2 (counterexample). The triple
(
b, b, h
)
is a counterexample for
the map f if dom b = dom b and there is a map g such that
h : (domb)→ {f, g}
{0} ⊂
{
f
(
b
)
− f (b) , g
(
b
)
− g (b)
}
.
This definition is devised exactly to formulate the following lemma, which is an
easy arithmetical statement:
Lemma 3 (lll69). Assume that
(
b, b, h
)
is a counterexample for f , and that
2 ≤ |dom b| < +∞. Then
f (b)−
1
|dom b|
∑
(h (i)) (b) 6= f
(
b
)
−
1∣∣domb∣∣
∑
(h (i))
(
b
)
.
In turn, the lemma above can finally be combined with corollary 1 into the main
theorem:
Theorem 1 (tt01). Assume that
(
b, b, h
)
is a counterexample for f , with 2 ≤
|dom b| < +∞. Moreover, assume that
∀i ∈ dom b there are j
i
, Xi, ji, X i satisfying
j
i
∈ domb\ {i}
Xi is adequate for
(
b−
{
i, j
i
}
, b
(
j
i
)
, f, i, j
i
)
f
(
dom b×
{
b
(
j
i
)})
= (h (i)) (b)
ji ∈ domb\ {i}
Xi is adequate for
(
b−
{
i, ji
}
, b
(
ji
)
, f, i, ji
)
f
(
dom b×
{
b
(
ji
)})
= (h (i))
(
b
)
.
Finally, suppose that
∀b′ ∈
⋃
i∈dom b
X i ∪Xi
∑
k∈dom b′
P (‖b′ − k‖) = f (b′) .
Then
f (b)−
∑
i∈dom b
P (‖b− i‖) 6= f
(
b
)
−
∑
i∈dom b
P
(∥∥b− i∥∥) .
7 Conclusions
We developed a result characterizing imbalanced auction mechanisms. Both the
theorem and the proof are new to the best of our knowledge, and we informally
illustrated the idea behind the proof.
On the formal side, the proof has been implemented in the Isabelle/HOL
theorem prover, which is especially important in this case, because the confidence
added by the formalization is a significant soundness validation for any new
result.
Given a rather general class of auction mechanisms, our theorem provides
explicit conditions implying the imbalance condition, and in this sense it can
also be regarded as a result in reverse game theory. Moreover, our theorem
also explicitly constructs a finite set on which the imbalance condition holds:
this can be exploited in concrete implementations to computationally check the
imbalance condition only over that known, finite set.
The fact that the proof and the result are new also leaves open many avenues
for possible generalizations and improvements. For example, assumption (12)
was taken for the sake of simplicity, but less immediate assumptions are also
possible. Similarly, Definition 2 is merely the simplest one granting that Lemma
3 holds: there are plenty of ways to achieve the same result, which can lead
to different final requirements on f appearing in the statement of Theorem 1.
Currently, ForMaRE is following these tracks to investigate further developments
of possible interest to its application domain, auction theory.
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